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Introduction
Should the Federal Government expend over $100 million in
subsidies1 to help keep a professional baseball team from moving to
another city? In 1995 the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued four
Private Letter Rulings which permitted Ewing Kauffman's estate a
deduction for his bequest of the Kansas City Royals to a non-profit,
public charity.2 One critic argued that the IRS relied on "twisted
reasoning" to unreasonably alter existing statutes and regulations in
order to grant the deduction.
3
This Note examines the so-called Succession Plan, focusing
particularly on the IRS's finding that the Plan serves the charitable
purpose of lessening the burdens of government. First the participants,
their history, and their objectives are introduced. This Note then
discusses the IRS's ruling, and the criticism it received. Specifically,
most criticism attacked the IRS's decision that efforts on behalf of a
sports franchise can be a government burden. This Note addresses that
criticism in two ways. First, it is shown that numerous local
governments actively and continuously work to gain or retain
franchises. Second, the IRS is in no position to make subjective value
judgments on the worthiness of government activities. A modification
of the test for determining whether an activity lessens the burden of
government is also proposed in order to inject some fairness into IRS
1. Technically this Note concerns a $100 million estate tax deduction, not a government
expenditure. However, exemptions and deductions are generally comparable to subsidies. See
Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983)("Both tax
exemptions and tax deductibility are a form of subsidy that is administered through the tax
system. . . . Deductible contributions are similar to cash grants of the amount of the amount of
a portion of the individual's contribution."). See also Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 699
(Harlan, J.); Id. at 704, 708 (Douglas, J., dissenting)("A tax exemption is a subsidy.").
2. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-30024 (July 28, 1995); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-30-025 (July 28, 1995); Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 95-30-026 (July 28, 1995); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-37-035 (Sept. 15, 1995). See also IRS
Approves 'Advisory Fund' component of Kansas City Royals Transaction, 95 EXEMPT ORG. TEXT
38-3, Sept. 20, 1995, available in LEXIS, FEDTAX Library, PLR File [hereinafter Priv. Ltr. Rul.
95]. Private Letter Rulings may not be used or cited as precedent. I.R.C. §61100)(3) (West
1996).
The Private Letter Rulings answer a total of thirty specific "requested rulings" concerning
the corporate status of the S corporation that owns the Royals, Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-30-026 (July 28,
1995), the effects on the Kauffman Private Foundation, Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-30-025 (July 28, 1995),
the status of independent "Donor" funds set up to facilitate the plan, Priv. Ltr. Ruls. 95-30-024
(July 28, 1995), 95-30-025 (July 28, 1995), and 95-37035 (Sept. 15, 1995), and the effect on the
donee community foundation, Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-30-024 (July 28, 1995). ,
3. Paul Streckfus, Rulings in Search of a Rationale, 95 TAX NOTES TODAY, Aug. 4, 1995, at
160-24, available in LEXIS, FEDTAX Library, TNT File.
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rulings. Considering that this Note concerns a baseball team, it is
appropriate for its structure to approximate a baseball telecast: the
Lineup, the Play by Play, and final conclusions.
I
The Lineup
The lineup behind the Succession Plan consists of the Kansas City
Royals' former owner, Mr. Kauffman, the Royals' governing directors
("the Partnership"), the team, and the Greater Kansas City
Community Foundation and Affiliated Trusts ("Kansas City
Foundation").
A. Leading Off... Mr. Ewing Kauffnan
"God will always send an angel like Mr. Kauffman to put wind
beneath your wings."
Jesse Jackson4
For the people of Kansas City, Royals fans and not, Ewing
Kauffman's philanthropy continues to be wind beneath their wings.5
An active and generous philanthropist, Mr. Kauffman founded and
endowed the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation, which operates
various programs in the Kansas City Area broadly devoted to
preparing the youth of the city for their futures.6 He died on August 8,
1993, leaving much of his fortune in various trusts.7 One trust ("the
Kauffman Trust") held all outstanding stock in the Kansas City
4. The Patriarchs: Prominent Businessmen and Civic Leaders in Kansas City, Missouri,
INGRAM'S, Oct. 1994, at 31.
5. Mr. Kauffman was born in 1916, earned an associate degree at Kansas City Junior
College, served in the Navy during World War II, and founded Marion Laboratories in 1950.
Marion merged with Merrill Dow in 1989, launching Mr. Kauffman into the ranks of this
country's wealthiest individuals. Mr. Kauffman is a member of the Entrepreneurs Hall of Fame,
the National Sales Hall of Fame, and a recipient of the Harry S. Truman Foundation's Good
Neighbor Award and the Horatio Alger Award. He died in July 1993. Ewing M. Kaufman-
Chairman Emeritus of Morton Merrel Dow, Inc., Philanthropist and Owner of the Kansas City
Royals, PR NEwswIRE, Aug. 1, 1993, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, BUSDTL File
[hereinafter Kauffman].
6. Id. The foundation has nearly one billion dollars in assets and, in 1994-95, "allocated
$21.6 million to its Youth Development operating program and $15.4 million to its second
operating program, the Center for Entrepreneurial Leadership." Foundation Annual Reports,
CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY, Feb. 22, 1996, at 22 [hereinafter Foundation Annual Reports].
7. Kauffman, supra note 5.
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Royals.8 By its terms, the Kauffman Trust was to transfer ownership of
the Royals to a local charity and a partnership which would run the
team.
After doctors diagnosed Mr. Kauffman with bone cancer, he
decided to ensure that the Royals would remain in Kansas City after
his death. Major League Baseball had other ideas: it required his
estate to sell the team to an active owner, local or not.9 Given the
paucity of multi-millionaires in the Kansas City area willing to pay
over one hundred million dollars for the team and the short timetable
caused by his condition, Mr. Kauffman faced serious obstacles and did
what any billionaire would do: he called in legal counsel.10 Counsel
developed a brilliant plan, deploying trusts, advisory funds, limited
partnerships, stock transfer restrictions, and the re-capitalization of
stock in a numbing combination that ultimately gave equity ownership
of the Royals to the Kansas City Community Foundation.1" The
Succession Plan guaranteed that the Royals would remain local for at
least six years, during which time only local buyers could purchase the
team and, after IRS approval, secured Mr. Kauffman's estate a
deduction for partial value of the team) 2 If the IRS had refused, the
Royals would have been transferred to one of Mr. Kauffman's private
foundations, whose trustees would have been forced to sell the team as
soon as possible, whether the buyer was local or not. 13
8. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-30-024 (July 28, 1995). One trust disbursed $990 million to the Ewing
Marion Kauffman Foundation after his death in 1993. Foundation Annual Reports, supra note 6,
at 22.
9. Lee A. Sheppard, The Kansas City Royals' Curve Ball, 93TAx NOTES TODAY, 155-4, July
26, 1993, at 155-54 [hereinafter Sheppard, Curve Ball]; Lee A. Sheppard, Your Bread, Kansas
City's Circus, 95 TAX NOTES TODAY, May 11, 1995, at 92-7 [hereinafter Sheppard, Circus]; IRS
Allows Donation of Baseball Team, TR. AND EsT., June 1995, at 6.
10. The firm of Shook, Hardy & Bacon handled the transfer, with tax attorney Stanley
Weiner taking the lead. Scott Mcartney, Kansas City Royals Score A Big Victory With Pitch to
IRS, WALL ST. J., May 8, 1995, at B1O.
11. Streckfus, supra note 3 at 160-24.
12. Id. The IRS spent two years studying the proposal before succumbing to its reasoning.
A ruling was requested on March 30, 1994. After supplementing and amending the proposal in
twenty-three letters and two meetings, the parties received the ruling on May 1, 1995. Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 95-30-024 (July 28, 1995). Stanley Weiner expected the ruling eighteen months earlier, in
August 1993. Sheppard, Curve Ball, supra note 9, at 155-4.
13. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-30-024 (July 28, 1995). The IRS noted that "[d]ue to the economics
involved, the purchaser would likely move the team" from the Kansas City area. Id. Had the
service refused to agree to the Royals' Succession Plan, the team could still have been donated to
a foundation; however, it would have to be sold immediately as a commercial not charitable,
enterprise. Mcartney, supra note 10, at B10.
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Mr. Kauffman could not simply give the Royals to charity and
expect them to operate the team for six years or until a local buyer was
found. To begin with, the Royals generate annual operating losses a
charity could not hope to fund.14 The Succession Plan accounted for
those losses by the terms of the Kauffman Trust. The Trust donated
both equity stock of the Kansas City Royals and over $37.6 million
from the sale of other assets to a "Donor Advisory Fund," run by the
Kansas City Foundation.' That money, plus $5 million from several
surviving Kauffmans, and $10 million from the Ewing Marion
Kauffman Foundation, was used to buy the remaining equity stock
from the team, which then used the cash for its operating expenses. 6
Mr. Kauffman's philanthropy was two-fold: "his first goal was to
keep the team at home, and his second goal was to make sure that the
value of the team was enjoyed by the charity."'17 These goals were
accomplished by giving the team to a charity which could retain the
proceeds from a sale and had to sell to a local buyer.
B. Batting Second ... The Kansas City Royals
The Kansas City Royals are owned by an S Corporation18 whose
principal place of business is Kansas.' 9 Its only asset is the Kansas City
Royals, a member of the American League Western Division. In 1969,
after the Kansas City Athletics left for Oakland, and the American
League sold Mr. Kauffman an expansion franchise he named the
14. See infra text accompanying note 27.
15. See discussion infra Part II. The total gift has been estimated at $150 million. TR. AND
EST., supra note 9, at 6. A more conservative estimate is $100 million. Tax Watch, Donation of
Team is Charitable Gift, IRS Says, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY, May 18, 1995, at 43.
16. Bob Luder, 'No Place Like Home' Night Attracts 21,657 Fans, KAN. CITY STAR, July 24,
1995, at C4. The Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation's grant was dealt with in Private Letter
Ruling 95-30-025, (July 28, 1995)(ruling (1) grant is not "self dealing" under I.R.C. § 4941 (West
1995), (2) grant is a "qualifying distribution" in assessing penalties for failure to distribute income
under I.R.C. § 4942 (West 1995), and (3) advisory fund receiving the grant will not be attributed
to foundation for purposes of "excess business holdings" under I.R.C. § 4943 (West 1995)).
17. Stanley Weiner, quoted in Tax Watch supra note 15, at 43. Technically the Rulings do
not identify the parties, but it is readily evident from the storm of publicity and the introductions
to the commercial publications of the Rulings. See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-30-026 (July 28,
1995)(naming Kansas City Royals as subject of Letter Rulings).
18. An S corporation is organized under Subchapter S of the I.R.C. It is treated as a "pass-
through" entity which means the shareholders, and not the corporation, are responsible for
income and losses under the I.R.C. See generally SAMUEL P. STARR, 731 TAX MANAGEMENT
PORTFOLIO: S CORPORATIONS: OPERATIONS (BNA 1992).
19. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-30-024 (July 28, 1995).
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Royals.' Since then, the Royals have won six American League West
titles, two pennants, and the 1985 World Series.21
Most Major League Baseball teams have seen their franchise
value decline from the heady days of the late eighties and early
nineties. 2 Since the Succession Plan took effect, marginal
improvement has been achieved as a result of an agreement resolving
troubling labor issues.' These issues had caused the cancellation of
one World Series, as well as declining attendance and revenues? The
labor agreement enhanced the Kansas City Royals value in a more
direct way: revenue sharing. By terms of the agreement, teams with
higher payrolls, usually large market teams in New York, Los Angeles,
or Baltimore, must pay a "luxury" tax. That "tax" is distributed to
teams with lesser payrolls, usually smaller market teams such as
Kansas City.15 These enhancements to the Royals' value, however, are
countered by detriments from continuing disorganization in Major
League Baseball governance, such as the lack of a commissioner, labor
strife, rising costs, and declining revenues from less lucrative television
deals and declining attendance.26 Small market teams like the Royals
have additional detriments such as a limited fan base and local
television rights' sales. The Royals reportedly lost $25 million in 1994,
which although covered by Mr. Kauffman out of his own fortune,
needed to be accounted for by the Succession Plan.'
Covering their annual operating loss was perhaps the Royals' only
objective in the Succession Plan, but for the Kansas City area the
Succession Plan was necessary to keep the team local. The difficulty in
20. Kauffman, supra note 5.
21. Id.
22. David Greising, America's Pastime. Yeah Right, Bus. WK., June 5, 1995, at 40. The
Kansas City Royals were valued at $96 million in 1995 and $80 million in 1996. Tuchar Atre, et
al., Financial World Mag., May 20, 1996, at 53 (untitled article concerning value of professional
sports franchises).
23. Bob Nightengale, Peace at Last, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1996, at C1. Owners claimed that
labor strife cost them over $800 million in revenues and they were not entirely confident that the
deal had cleared the way for "growth in the game." Id.
24. Id.
25. The tax is estimated to total at least $70 million. Id.
26. Larry Light, Harris Collingwood, Can Baltimore's Birds Bail Out Their Owner?, Bus.
WK., Feb. 22, 1993, at 84; Greising, supra note 22, at 4 (noting in 1995 fan attendance was down
20% and television advertising billing declined 30% in "many" markets). See generally Kevin E.
Mertens, Fair or Foul? The Survival of Small-Market Teams in Major League Baseball, 4 MARQ.
SPORTs L.J. 323 (Spring 1994)(discussing various elements contributing to decline in small market
profitability, including: broadcasting and gate revenue, licensing revenues, and rising salaries).
27. See TR. AND EST., supra note 9, at 6.
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keeping the Royals local stemmed from their unprofitably, the
uncertain state of Major League Baseball, the uncertainty of any
future appreciation in value, and the short timetable caused by Mr.
Kauffman's bone cancer, all of which made finding a local buyer
difficult. But, he could not simply give the team to the city or a charity
because Major League Baseball prohibited a municipality or charity
from operating one of its teams. 8 In order to split operating control
and equity ownership, the S corporation underwent a tax-free
recapitilaization, converting its one class of stock into three?9 The
class A stock holds the voting rights, while the class B and C are
simple equity stock subject to the "drag-along" rights of the class A
stock. The class B and C shareholders may not dispose of their stock
without a concurrent sale of the class A stock, which has the only
voting rights, effectively giving the right of disposition solely to the
class A shareholders. Thus, the Royals could be operated by one
group, while another held the remaining residual value.
C. Moving The Runners Along ... The Partnership
The Trustees of the Kauffman Trust appointed five investors to a
Partnership which holds all the Royals' class A voting stock and acts as
a kind of Board of Directors.' Each partner paid $450,000 for his
shares, although the value is frozen so he can only recover his
investment. 1 The sole general partner is David Glass, who also serves
as chief executive and chairman of the Royals and as their designated
representative to Major League Baseball. 2 He is also president and
chief executive officer of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. and rumored to be a
possible future buyer of the Royals.'
The Succession Plan required a professional steward for the team
because Major League Baseball prohibits any charity or municipality
from operating one of "its" clubs. This prohibition stems from possible
28. For the reasoning behind the prohibition, see infra text accompanying note 34.
29. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-30-026 (July 28, 1995). An S corporation cannot have more than one
class of stock, but the corporation will be treated as having only one share if all of the stock
shares identical distribution and liquidation rights. I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(D) (West 1996). The IRS
approved the recapitilization in Private Letter Ruling 95-30-026 (July 28, 1995).
30. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-30-024 (July 28, 1995).
31. Lee A. Sheppard, The Kansas City Royals, Part Z 93 TAX NOTES TODAY, Aug. 4, 1993, at
163-50 [hereinafter Sheppard, The Kansas City Royals]. The partnership's shares represent
control of the Royals so their value is enhanced for determining the deduction allowed on other
shares. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-30-026 (July 28, 1995).
32. Mcartney, supra note 10, at B10.
33. Id.
1997]
conflicts of fiduciary duty. An owner must first and foremost act in the
interests of the Royals, Major League Baseball, the other baseball
franchise clubs, and the game of baseball, in general, before
considering the interests of a charitable organization or municipality.
Each team names a Designated Representative of the team who
represents its interests, and the interests of other clubs.-
Since the Partnership operated the Royals, it would also conduct
the sale. Pursuant to a shareholder agreement, the Partnership cannot
sell the team during the first three years except to a buyer
who (i) is acceptable to [Major League Baseball]; (ii) is a resident of
the greater [Kansas] City area; and (iii) agrees to retain the Team in
the greater City area (a "resident purchaser"). During the following
three years, the Partnership must use its best efforts to sell the Class
A stock to a resident purchaser. If the sale is to a resident purchaser,
the purchase price must be the fair market value as restricted to sale
within the greater City area.
35
Thus the Partnership's crucial role was to operate the club and to lead
the sale.
D. And Batting Cleanup . . . The Greater Kansas City Community
Foundation and Affiliated Trusts
In 1978, the Greater Kansas City Community Foundation was
founded by seven prominent Kansas city residents who passed a hat
around and collected $219.13 and a few foreign coins.' In order to
34. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-30-026 (July 28, 1995). The IRS cited a memorandum of February 11,
1988, from then Commissioner Peter V. Ueberroth, which stated in pertinent part
Responsibility and Accountability. Ownership must recognize the fiduciary
relationship each club has with each other club in Baseball and act accordingly.
Consequently, the policy of any new owner must be to own and operate a baseball club
for its own sake and in a sound fiscal manner, and not for the benefit of other
businesses at the expense of the club or the overall good of the game. The key element
is that there be within the ownership structure clearly designated persons who are
accountable to Baseball for the manner of operation and compliance with the rules of
Baseball. Ultimately a single person must be in control and be responsible for and able
to make all club decisions. That individual must represent that he or she will participate
actively in the operation of the club and will attend ownership meetings on a regular
basis.
Because the partnerships' fiduciary duties to the for-profit Royals and Major League baseball
would take precedence over its fiduciary duties to the Community Foundation if a conflict arose,
the IRS refused to grant a deduction to the partners for their purchase of shares. Priv. Ltr. Rul.
95-30-026 (July 28, 1995).
35. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-30-024 (July 28, 1995). If the Succession Plan failed to fund the
Royals' losses, then the partnership could sell the team free of restrictions. Id.
36. Debra Skodack, Foundation is a Powerful Philanthropic Force, KAN. CITY STAR, June 25,
1994, at Al [hereinafter Skodack, Philanthropic Force].
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achieve economies of scale, the Kansas City Community Foundation
merged with an association of trusts to form the Greater Kansas City
Community Foundation and Affiliated Trusts ("Kansas City
Foundation") in 1986.37 The combined entity now boasts over $270
million in assets representing 445 charitable funds.
38
Community foundations are popular organizations for localized
philanthropy and are located in every state and every major
metropolitan area. 39 The top 450 or so community foundations exceed
$10.4 billion in assets. 4 In 1993, community foundations received
more than $865 million and gave over $730 million to charitable
causes.41 The Kansas City Foundation ranked sixteenth in assets in
199242 while ranking eighth in grant-making and second in gifts
received in 1995.41
The popularity of community foundations rests in their flexibility
and economies of scale which allow them to serve the community in
many ways. The Kansas City Foundation encourages philanthropy
using a variety of fundraising techniques,' makes grants to and
coordinates the services of local charities, 45 and manages diverse
37. Id.
38. Ruth B. Bigus, Royals Put Foundation in Spotlight, KAN. CITY STAR, Sept. 26, 1995, at
D7.
39. Community Foundation Factsheet, Council on Foundations (Jan. 1995)(copy on file with
author)(courtesy of Kansas City Community Foundation).
40. Stuart Appelbaum, Development Deliberations, FOUNDATION NEWS AND COMMENTARY,
Jan./Feb. 1996, at 42 (also noting rapid rise of community foundations as evidenced by 50%
growth in contributions equal to $400 million). Still, private foundations far outnumber
community foundations by about 36,000 to 450. Skodack, Philanthropic Force, supra note 36, at
Al. The largest community foundation is the New York Community Trust, with over $1 billion in
assets. Community Foundation Factsheet, supra note 39.
41. Community Foundation Factsheet, supra note 39. 1993 is the most recent year for which
statistics are available.
42. Debra Skodack, Foundation's Elite are in Touch, KAN. CITY STAR, June 25, 1994, at A18.
Assets totalled $126,354,000 and grants equaled $16,209,00 in 1992. Id.
43. Foundation Ranks Second Nationally in Gifts Received, GREATER KAN. CITY COMMUNITY
FOUNDATION AND AFFILIATED TRUSTS NEWSL., Fall 1995, at 1 [hereinafter KAN. CITY FOUNDATION
NEWSL.](receiving $49,265,000). The Greater Kansas City Community Foundation And Affiliated
Trusts, Fact Sheet, THE GREATER KANSAS CITY COMMUNITY FOUNDATION AND AFFILIATED TRUSTS,
Dec. 12, 1995 [hereinafter Kansas City Fact Sheet].
44. The Kansas City Foundation solicits grants by offering at least eight different types of
funds covering approximately 450 charitable causes. Mark Davis, Not All Charitable Funds Cost a
Fortune, KAN. CITY STAR, Nov. 12, 1995, at Bi.
45. In the last seventeen years the Foundation has distributed ninety-eight million dollars in
grants to local charitable organizations. Kansas City Fact Sheet, supra note 43. The Foundation
distributed more than $18 million in grants in 1994 to more than 550 non-profits. Bigus, supra
note 38, at G10.
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portfolios for the deposited funds or donations (i.e. managing other
charities' funds or donor funds). 6
1. Tax Characteristics of a Community Foundation
Like most charities, community foundations are creatures of the
Internal Revenue Code ("Code" or "I.R.C."),47 depending on it for
exemption from income tax and deductions for donors.' Thus, the
Treasury Department's definition is crucial: Community trusts have
often been established to attract large contributions of a capital or
endowment nature for the benefit of a particular community or area,
and often such contributions have come initially from a small number
of donors. While the community trust generally has a governing body
comprised of representatives of the particular community or area, its
contributions are often received and maintained in the form of
separate trusts or funds, which are subject to varying degrees of
control by the governing body.49
This definition contains three factors that play important roles in
the Royals Succession Plan. Community foundations are (a) "Publicly
Supported," (b) run by directors broadly representative of its target
community, and (c) largely comprised of individuals funds or trusts.
The first factor simply requires an organization be operated and
46. Community Foundation Factsheet, supra note 39. The Kansas City Foundation provides
accounting services, annual audits and tax return preparation, professional investment services,
and "communications/public relations support." Kansas City Fact Sheet, supra note 43.
47. See I.R.C. §§ 501(c)(3), 509(a)(1), 170(b)(1)(A)(vi) (West 1996).
48. I.R.C. § 170 (West 1996).
49. Treas. Regs. 1.170A-9(e)(10) (1996). The Council on Foundations concurs: "A
Community Foundation is a publicly supported philanthropic institution governed by a board of
private citizens chosen to be representative of the public interest and for their knowledge of the
community. It administers individual funds contributed or bequeathed to it by individuals, other
agencies, governments corporations and other sources." SCANLAN, A LEXICON FOR COMMUNITY
FOUNDATIONS 3 (Council on Foundations 1988)(quoted in Daniel L. Dement, Using a Community
Foundation to Achieve Charitable Goals, 19 No. 6 EST. PLANNING, Nov./Dec. 1992, at 352). For a
self described "detailed analysis," see Lauren W. Cesare, Public Foundations and Public
Charities-Definition and Classification, TAX MGMT. EST. GIFTS AND TR. PORTFOLIOS, 296-3d (1992).
Another definition is provided in JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, NON PROFIT
ORGANIZATIONS (1995), at 638-39:
A community foundation is a 501(c)(3) organization that is created to receive and
administer funds contributed by members of a particular community and to disburse
those funds for charitable purposes within that community. The typical community
foundation has a broadly representative governing board and its funds are
administered professionally, often by a group of banks that act as trustees. Because
they receive their support from a broad constituency, community foundations are
public charities and . . . donors often find them to be a desirable alternative to a
private foundation.
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organized for a charitable purpose. Each of the trusts and funds
comprising a community foundation must serve a charitable purpose,
which is discussed in Part II below. The second and third factors,
discussed immediately below, make the Community Foundation the
logical depository for the Royals.
a. Broadly Representative Board of Directors.
Although the Treasury Regulations do not require a diverse
board for community foundations,' they do list board diversity as an
important factor in a number of "facts and circumstances tests."51
Other non-tax factors also compel the formation of a board broadly
representative of the community. Community foundations hold funds
and property that are considered community assets, thus decisions
should be made with community-wide consensus. They make grants to
a wide variety of local charities resulting in working relationships
whereby a myriad of local charities contribute their expertise.52 Also, a
community foundation's range of activities, including fundraising,
investment, and grant making, demands broad expertise provided by a
diverse board. The broadly representative board of the Kansas City
50. The sections relating to community trusts only require it to "have a common governing
body or distribution committee which either directs or, in the case of a fund designated for
specified beneficiaries, monitors the distribution of all of the funds exclusively for charitable
purposes." Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(e)(11)(v)(A) (1996).
51. The 10% "facts and circumstances" option for the "publicly supported test" lists as the
first of a few enumerated factors a "Broadly representative governing body":
The fact that an organization has a governing body which represents the broad interests
of the public, rather than the personal or private interests of a limited number of
donors (or persons standing in a relationship to such donors ...) will be taken into
account in determining whether an organization is "publicly supported." An
organization will be treated as meeting this requirement if it has a governing body
(whether designated in the organization's governing instrument or bylaws as a Board of
directors, Board of Trustees, etc.) which is comprised of public officials acting in their
capacities as such; of individuals selected by public officials acting in their capacities as
such; of persons having special knowledge or expertise in the particular field or
discipline in which the organization is operating; of community leaders, such as elected
or appointed officials, clergymen, educators, civic leaders, or other such persons
representing a broad cross-section of the views and interests of the community; or, in
the case of a membership organization, of individuals elected pursuant to the
organization's governing instrument or bylaws by a broadly based membership.
Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(e)(3)(v) (1996). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-3(d)(1) (1996)(relating to
advanced rulings).
52. JOHN A. EDIE, FIRST STEPS IN STARTING A FOUNDATION, 25-27 (Council on Foundations
3d ed. 1993), excerpted in FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 49, at 639-42.
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Community Foundation made it an acceptable steward for what
Ewing Kauffman considered a community asset: the Royals.5
b. Separate Funds and Trusts
A final charcteristic of community foundations are independent
"separate trusts or funds, which are subject to varying degrees of
control by the governing body."'  These "funds" are far more
accessible to donors than if they established their own private
foundation. While start-up costs for a Private Foundation may run to
$10,000, that same amount is sufficient to fund a Charity Fund
administered within an umbrella community foundation.55 The
community foundation pools separate funds and trusts to support a
full-time, expert staff for fundraising, investment, and grant making
servicesi6
In addition to administrative savings, donors receive a charitable
deduction at the maximum federal rate because community
foundations are considered public charities, not private foundations.'
In addition to these and other attractions, 8 donors are attracted
53. Jan Kreamer, The Kansas City Community Foundation's executive director, described
the foundation as trustee of a community asset (the Royals) which, once sold, would yield funds
for distribution throughout the community. Bigus, supra note 38, at B7.
54. Treas. Regs. §§ 1.170A-9(e)(10) (1996).
55. Foundations tend to attract mid range donations in the $10-25,000 area. Although that
amount is not enough to start a private foundation, it allows the donors to retain some of the
control allowed to private foundations or private trusts. The range of donations may be the
reason why community foundations rarely exist in smaller communities. EDIE, supra note 52, at
601-05 ("In most cases a community with less than 250,000 people cannot support a community
foundation; a minimum population of 400,000 or more provides a reliable base."); Davis, supra
note 44, at G10. The Kansas City Foundation charges 1% of the fund's assets plus $150 in fees; a
$10,000 fund will cost $250 a year. Id.
56. Davis, supra note 44, at G10. See also EDIE, supra note 52.
57. Gifts to a public charity may be deducted against up to 50% of Adjusted Gross Income
(AGI), while gifts to other foundations are capped at 30%. I.R.C. §§ 170(b)(1)(A)-(B) (West
1996). The difference is heightened by the existence of a maximum five-year carryover on
charitable deductions. I.R.C. § 170(d)(1). Also, gifts of long-term capital gain property have a
similar advantageous rate of deductibility (30% compared to 20% of AGI) and, more
importantly, either the fair market value or adjusted basis (whichever is higher) of such property
is deductible when donated to a public charity, while only the adjusted basis may be deducted on
such gifts to foundations. I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(C) (West 1996).
58. Some charities start their own funds (Agency Endowments) to benefit from
professional investment services and fundraising efforts (any donor may contribute to any fund
run by community foundations). This has the added benefit of shielding the funds from the
charity's creditors. Davis, supra note 44, at G10. Also, funds are generally named after the
primary donor, "thereby providing an opportunity to give his or her family name a place in the
philanthropic history of the community." EDIE, supra note 52, at 641. For other benefits to
donors offered by community foundations, see generally Dement, supra note 49, at 352; Malvin
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because of the flexibility of funds. The flexibility arises from the
varying degrees of control donors exercise over their funds. A donor
may designate which agency is to receive the funds' interest or corpus,
but the designation must be contemporaneous with the donation.
59
Donors wishing to reserve the choice for disbursement of their
donations may create a "Donor Advised Fund." This fund grants the
donor the right to recommend, at any time, how fund assets are to be
used, but leaves the ultimate decision to the trustees.' A "Field of
Interest Fund" allows a donor to designate a "cause" to which the
fund pays out.61 An increasingly popular fund is an "Agency Fund,"
established by other charities for themselves, but administered by the
foundation.'
The Kansas City Foundation set up two funds for the Succession
Plan: the Donor Advisory Fund and the Royals Succession Plan Fund.
The Donor Advisory Fund received Royals equity stock and cash
donated by Mr. Kauffman's trust. The Royals Succession Plan Fund
received donations from the public and the Ewing Marion Kauffman
Foundation, which it used to purchase additional stock from the team
(thus providing the team with a cash infusion to fund its operating
losses). 63 The IRS determined that the two funds were component
parts of the Kansas City Foundation, thus assuring donors the
maximum rate of income tax deductibility' and Kauffman's estate its
Bank, Community Foundations: State of the Art Planning "Donor Directed" Funds: New Vehicles
for Utilizing Community Foundations, ALI-ABA/ABA SECTION OF TAXATION COURSE OF STUDY-
TAX EXEMPT CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS, Nov. 19, 1992; Edward Jay Beckwith, David L.
Marshall, John A. Edie, ESTABLISHING AN ADVISED FUND PROGRAM (Council on Foundations
1992); Davis, supra note 44.
59. EDIE, supra note 52, at 641.
60. Id. See also Beckwith, et al., supra note 58, at 3 ("An advised fund is an unrestricted
component fund where, for a limited period of time, the donor exercises the privilege of making
nonbinding recommendations to the governing body of the community foundation suggesting
which charitable organization should receive grants from the fund."). Any organization which
relies on donations, and solicits donations in such funds, would probably not contravene the
donor's advice.
61. EDIE, supra note 52, at 641.
62. Davis, supra note 44, at G10; EDIE, supra note 52, at 641. The Kansas Community
Foundation reported fifty and fifty-six new funds in its last two quarterly newsletters respectively.
KAN. CITY FOUNDATION NEWSL., supra note 43, at 2-3.
63. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-30-035 (Sept. 15, 1995). The cash was donated with the requirement
that it be used to purchase the stock. In assessing the cash donation, the IRS concluded that the
gift was of stock and the value of the stock. The cash donation would be the amount of the
deduction. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-30-026 (July 28, 1995).
64. For an explanation of the different possible rates of deductibility for donations, see
supra, note 57.
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estate tax deduction, while avoiding imposition of Chapter 42, private
foundation' taxes on the funds. 6 To arrive at its findings, the IRS had
to decide that the funds were "component parts" of the community
foundation, free of any "material restriction or condition" 67 serving a
charitable purpose.' A material restriction or condition "prevents the
transferee organization from freely and effectively employing the
transferred assets"' and limits their "ultimate and direct authority and
control over the fund."' Since donations were contingent on
purchasing stock and the stock itself was burdened by "drag along"
restrictions, one might imagine that material restrictions were present.
The IRS interpreted the applicable Treasury Regulations as
suggesting that if the restrictions on a fund were "important to the
donee's charitable purposes, the regulation concludes that a restriction
requiring such retention is not material." 7' This doctrine of
"importance" applies to the Kansas City Foundation because it cannot
own class A stock (Major League Baseball forbids it), and violating
that prohibition would sink the Succession Plan. Therefore, the
restriction was necessary to the plan and its exempt purpose.'
In sum, the Kansas Community Foundation has a broadly
representative board, and a full-time administrative staff to oversee a
large number of independent trusts and funds over which the donors
exercise varying degrees of control. All of those aspects make a
65. Rules imposed on private foundations under Chapter 42 include section 4940 (imposing
a 2% tax on investment income); section 4941 (penalties for certain kinds of self-dealing); section
4943 (prohibition on excessive business holdings); section 4944 (limitations on high risk
investments); and section 507(a) (tax on termination of Private Foundation Status).
66. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-37-035 (Sept. 15, 1995).
67. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(e)(11)(ii)(B) (1996).
68. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-37-035 (Sept. 15, 1995). The IRS concluded that the Fund served the
Charitable purpose of lessening the burdens of government. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-30-024 (July 28,
1995). That finding is the heart of the Private Letter Rulings and the focus of all published
criticism. It is dealt with separately and at length below. See infra Part II.
69. Treas. Reg. § 1.507-2(a)(8)(i) (1996):
[A] transferor private foundation may not impose any material restriction or condition
that prevents the transferee organization . . . from freely and effectively employing
the transferred assets, or the income derived therefrom, in furtherance of its exempt
purposes. Whether or not a particular condition or restriction imposed upon a transfer
of assets is material . . . must be determined from all of the facts and circumstances of
the transfer.
70. Treas. Reg. § 1.507-2(a)(8)(iii)(C).
71. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-37-035 (Sept. 15, 1995)(citingTreas. Reg. § 1.507-2(a)(8)(iii)(D)).
72. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-37-035 (Sept. 15, 1995). On the flip side, the Fund does not further the
continuing interests of donors since they will be divested. Id.
HASTINGS COMM/E:;NT L.J. [VOL. 19:483
BALL FOUR: THE IRS WALKS THE KANSAS CrrY ROYALS
community foundation an attractive repository of donations and an
ideal steward for the Kansas City Royals.
2. Obstacles to the Kansas City Foundation's Exempt Status
Aside from the individual Funds, the Succession Plan threatened
the Kansas Community Foundation's status as a section 501(c)(3) and
section 509(a)(1) organization in two ways: (1) theFoundation could
not "impermissibly intertwine the community foundation's exempt
purposes with the nonexempt commercial purposes" of the Royals,'
and (2) the Foundation could not retain its "publicly supported" (as
opposed to private foundation) status if too large a proportion of its
funds came from too few donors.74 Of lesser importance to the
Foundation was whether income from the temporary investment of
funds earmarked for purchase of Royals' stock, or the profit from their
sale, would be "unrelated business taxable income" (UBTI). 75
Stripped of detail, the IRS suggested that these funds would probably
be interest, dividends, or capital gains which are excluded from UBTI
under I.R.C. sections 512(b)(1) and (5).76
Avoiding the impermissible intertwining of exempt and for profit
enterprises was achieved by giving control to the partnership, as
discussed above. The IRS accepted this part of the plan based on its
position that it will not attribute the activities of one independent
entity to another.7 The officers and the partnership (as holders of the
voting stock) run the Royals' operations, thus the Kansas City
Foundation is not operating the business and in no danger of
intermingling its charitable purpose with a commercial one.
The Kansas City Foundation is a "publicly supported" charity.
That phrase connotes an organization which meets the requirements
of I.R.C. section 501(a),78 and avoids "Private Foundation" status
under I.R.C. section 509(a). An organization must demonstrate that it
is a "broadly, publicly supported organization" to avoid "Private
73. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-30-024 (July 28, 1995).
74. Id.
75. I.R.C. § 511(a) (West 1996). UBTI is gross income derived from any regularly carried
on unrelated trade or business, less deductions and modifications. I.R.C. § 512(a) (West 1996).
UBTI is taxed at the corporate rate. I.R.C. § 511(a)(1). See generally FiSHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra
note 49, at 725-825.
76. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-30-024 (July 28, 1995).
77. Id. (citing Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 438 (1943)).
78. I.R.C. section 501(a) authorizes exemption from income taxation for organizations
described in sections 501(c), (d), and 401(a).
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Foundation" status.9 Private foundations generally receive their
support from a single corporation or family group and concentrate on
distributing grants to other charities or individuals who perform
charitable works.
80
Congress has imposed various excise taxes and allowed only
minimal deductibility for donations to private foundations.8' An
organization can avoid these burdens by demonstrating it has wide-
spread support under the "public support test." Simply put, total
support is a denominator, with "good" (i.e., public) support in the
numerator, and the result must be 331/3% or greater.8' The Royals
Succession Plan calls for donations from the Kauffman Trust of equity
stock potentially worth $100 million, and about $40 million from the
Kauffman Private Foundation, which are included in the total support
denominator, but largely excluded from the "good" support
numerator, severely skewing the public support test against the Kansas
City Foundation.83 Thus, the Kansas City Foundation needed to
employ certain exceptions to avoid Private Foundation status."
79. Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-(3).
80. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 49, at 589-99. These general statements are not hard
and fast rules. See Domenica Marchetti, Many Charities Provide More in Grants Than
Foundations Do, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY, Feb. 22, 1996, at 14. Public charities derive support
from a broad range of donors and often conduct, or organize, the charitable activities themselves.
A community foundation's main purposes are to acquire donated funds and property from a
broad spectrum of the public and government agencies, hold and invest those funds, and
distribute the income in the form of grants to one geographic location. In other words, serving
the "roles of fund-raiser, steward, and grant maker." Stuart Appelbaum, Development
Considerations, FOUNDATION NEWS AND COMMENTARY, Jan./Feb. 1996, at 42.
81. For income tax deduction restrictions, see supra note 57; for excise taxes see supra note
65. Congress suspected private foundations of being susceptible to abuse in shielding family
fortunes from tax by letting family members run the foundation and invest the funds while
drawing large salaries and disbursing few grants. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 49, at 589-99.
82. If an organization fails the 331/3% "mechanical" test it may try the 10% "facts and
circumstances" test. "Good support" means contributions from governmental units or the
general public. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(e)(ii)(2). However, 2% of the "total support" (the
denominator) is the maximum portion of any single gift that may be included in the "good
support" numerator. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(e)(6)(i).
83. The entire $140 million is added to the denominator but only 2% of that amount
($2,800,000), under a combination of Treas. Reg. section 1.170A-9(e)(6)(i) and I.R.C. section
4946(d), will count in the numerator and substantially drop the resulting overall percentage. The
Kansas City Foundation received $49,265,000 in 1994 and claimed 65% ($32,022,250) of it was
good support. Foundation Ranks Second Nationally in Gifts Received, KAN. CITY FOUNDATION
NEWSL., supra note 43, at 1. Now add $140,000,000 to the total support denominator for
$189,265,000 and 2% of that ($3,785,300) to the good support numerator (53,050,300). The new
good support/total support ratio is 28%. This keeps the Kansas City Foundation eligible for the
burdensome 10% facts and circumstances test, but the percentage is driven down even further by
the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation's grant of $40 million which undergoes the same
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The Regulations provide for the exclusion of "unusual grants"
from the public support fraction, both in the numerator and
denominator.' The IRS found characteristics of unusual grants in the
Succession Plan, including: gifts were unusual, unexpected, and not
likely to recur; the gifts were given by disinterested parties because of
the "publicly supported nature" of the Kansas City Foundation; and
since 1978, the Kansas City Foundation has passed the "publicly
supported" test and probably will continue to pass it in the future.'
These factors suggest that the Kauffmans were not trying to overly
influence or take over the Kansas City Foundation.8
7
II
The Royals Succession Plan's Charitable Purpose
Simply put, the Royals Succession Plan was the Kauffman Trust's
donation of stock and cash (used to purchase additional stock) to a
Donor Advisory Fund which held, and would ultimately sell, the stock
and keep the proceeds. To permit a deduction under the Code, the
IRS had to find that the plan served a charitable purpose. It is not
enough that an asset was given to charity because the funds would be
forced to immediately divest the for-profit enterprise.'
A. I.R.C. Section 501(a): Exclusive Charitable Purpose
I.R.C. section 501(a) states that a tax-exempt organization must
be organized and operated to (1) serve a charitable purpose (or, in
more conclusory terms, an "exempt" purpose) and (2) serve it
"exclusively."'  To receive a charitable deduction, Mr. Kauffman's
estate needed to convince the IRS that it donated the Royals stock
treatment. The numbers are hypothetical but the message is clear; unless the Kansas City
Foundation convinced the IRS to exempt the gift, it would jeopardize its exempt status under
I.R.C. § 509(a)(3).
84. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-30-024 (July 28, 1995).
85. Treas. Reg. § 1.70A-9(e)(6)(ii).
86. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-30-024 (July 28, 1995).
87. Id.
88. The Foundation would need to sell the for-profit enterprise because the only way it
could serve a charitable purpose would be if it were converted to cash which, in turn, would fund
charitable activities. By finding a charitable purpose in "keeping the team local," the IRS
permitted the Foundation to hold the team and allowed the Estate's tax deduction. Priv. Ltr. Rul.
95-30-024 (July 28, 1995).
89. An organization establishes its "charitable" or "exempt" purpose by passing the
"organizational" and "operational" tests. The organizational test is normally passed by including
relevant language in the articles of incorporation and will not be discussed further.
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and cash to funds which served a statutorily recognized charitable
purpose. In other words, to show how equity ownership of a
professional baseball team met the I.R.C. section 501(c)(3) definition
of an exempt organization:
Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation,
organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable,
scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes,
or to foster national or international amateur sports competition
(but only if no part of its activities involve the provision of athletic
facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children
or animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit
of any private shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the
activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise
attempting, to influence legislation (except as otherwise provided in
subsection (h)), and which does not participate in, or intervene in
(including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political
campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public
office.
When read carefully, it does not appear that keeping the Royals
in Kansas City serves one of the approved purposes. Keeping the
Royals in Kansas City is not "educational," "religious," or even
"charitable" in its general sense. Thankfully, the Kauffman estate
could rely on the regulatory gloss of that section, which states that
"lessening the burdens of Government" is charitable. 9' The estate
claimed that Mr. Kauffman's donation, which helps keep the Royals in
Kansas City, lessens the local governments' burden of doing so.
1. Lessening the Burden of Government
Lessening the burden of government has been recognized as a
charitable activity at least since the English Statute of Charitable Uses,
enacted in 1601.91 That statute's description of charity was judicially
imported by the United States Supreme Court in Wheeler v. Smith. 2
90. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (1996):
Charitable defined. The term charitable is used in section 501(c)(3) in its generally
accepted legal sense and is, therefore, not to be construed as limited by the separate
enumeration in section 501(c)(3) of other tax-exempt purposes which may fall within
the broad outlines of charity as developed by judicial decisions. Such term includes:
Relief of the poor and distressed or of the underprivileged; advancement of religion;
advancement of education or science; erection or maintenance of public buildings,
monuments, or works; lessening of the burdens of Government, and promotion of social
welfare by organizations designed to accomplish any of the above purposes.
Id. (empasis added).
91. 43 Eliz. I c.4 (1601), mentioned in Rev. Rul. 71-29, 1971-1 C.B. 150.
92. 50 U.S. 55, 77-78 (1850).
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The phrase "lessening the burden of government" was promulgated
into Regulations by the Treasury in 1959.93
Since Congress never referred to the doctrine in the Code, nor
included any legislative history in approving the Regulations, the
interpretation and formulation of analysis has been left to the
Treasury and the courts. The Treasury arrived at the current two-
prong test in General Counsel Memorandum 37,401, 94 which was
modified and finally published in Revenue Rulings 85-1 and 85-2. 5
The criteria for determining whether an activity lessens the burden of
government is "first, whether the governmental unit considers the
organization's activities to be its burden; and second, whether these
activities actually lessen the burden of the governmental unit."96
To fulfill the first prong and show that some governmental units
consider an activity its burden, the IRS seeks an "objective
manifestation by the governmental unit that it considers" the
organization to be lessening its burden. 7 The second prong,
"[w]hether the organization is actually lessening the burdens of
government[,] is determined by considering all of the relevant facts
and circumstances."9
a. Is the Succession Plan Actually a Burden of Government?
The IRS found that the Kansas City governments' efforts at
bringing and maintaining the Royals in Kansas City constituted an
"objective manifestation" indicating that the government considered it
their burden to retain the Royals.' In the mid-sixties, the county
initiated the State's creation of a Sports Authority, and the two
cooperated in financing, building, and operating the stadium
93. T.D. 6391, 1959-2 C.B. 139, amended by T.D. 6525, 1961-1 C.B. 186; T.D. 6939, 1968-1
C.B. 274; T.D.8308, 1990-2 C.B. 112.
94. Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,401 (February 2, 1978), revoked on other grounds, Gen. Couns.
Mem. 39,347 (March 15, 1985).
95. Rev. Rul. 85-1, 1985-1 C.B. 177; Rev. Rul. 85-2, 1985-1 C.B. 178. General Counsel
Memoranda cannot be cited or used as precedent, so taxpayers had to wait for Revenue Rulings
before relying on the two-part test.
96. Rev. Rul. 85-1, 1985-1 C.B. 178.
97. Id. at 179.
9& Id.
99. The Private Letter Ruling's description of the Kansas City and Missouri governments'
activities in securing and maintaining the Royals' presence consumes eighteen paragraphs. See
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-30-024 (July 28, 1995).
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complex.1' Bonds were issued and paid by a new property tax. 1 The
county acquired land for the complex and arranged for the building of
highways to service it. I The government subsidized the Royals' rent;
instead of a fair market value, the Royals only had to cover costs.,,
The government provided "substantial direct cash subsidies" to the
Club under a new lease signed in 1990.14 The IRS concluded,
"[c]learly the City, County, and State consider retaining professional
sports franchises to be as important a part of their responsibilities as
such 'traditional' governmental activities as mass transportation and
correctional facilities." 1)5
Thus, the IRS seemed satisfied that past activities designed to
mollify and support the Royals were objective manifestations that
local governments considered keeping the team local to be its
burden.1 6 This portion of the Private Letter Rulings provoked
immediate backlash. One commentator asked, "so what if Kansas City
objectively manifested that it considers retaining the Royals its
burden! '"107 Just because a city wants something, whether it be a team,
steel mill, or auto assembly plant, does not mean it is a burden, he
argued.1() Another critic noted that the Ruling reached the "outer
limits" of the lessening burden doctrine, which usually applies to
"more traditional governmental functions.""° The IRS admitted that
the doctrine generally applies to other functions, but excused itself, a
bit lamely, by recognizing that "the governmental units here have
100. Id. The County and Sports Authority built a Sports Complex in 1972-73 to house both
the Kansas City Royals and the Kansas City Chiefs. Steve Wilstein, ASSOCIATED PRESS ONLINE,
available in 1995 WL 4404787 (Sept. 2, 1995).




105. Id. (citations omitted). The reference to "traditional activities" refers to the precedents
on which the IRS relied. Private Letter Ruling 95-30-024 cites Revenue Ruling 78-68, 1978-1 C.B.
149 (organization "provides bus service to areas of a community unserved by regular public
transit"); Rev. Rul. 71-29, 1971-1 C.B. 150 (donation of funds to subsidize for-profit bus company
while city sought funds to purchase it); Rev. Rul. 70-583, 1970-2 C.B. 114 (community
correctional center that rehabilitates prisoners).
106. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-30-024 (July 28, 1995).
107. Streckfus, supra note 3, at 722, 724.
108. Id.
109. Fred Stokeld, Lobbyists, Ex-Hill Staffers Deny Undue Influence on EO Division, 95
EXEMPT ORGS. TEXT, Sept. 27, 1995, at 39-2
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shown an intense and unique interest in professional sports
franchises." "I
Both arguments seem to rest on outrage that local government
involvement in professional sports teams is condoned at the federal
level by grant of a charitable deduction l The IRS, however, seeks
evidence of governmental acceptance of a burden, and does not simply
approve any activity a governmental unit would like to pursue. The
IRS requires factual bases to establish "objective manifestation." 112 By
focusing on the facts of the activity and interrelationship of the
government and organization, the IRS can rely on evidence and avoid
the business of determining appropriate governmental activity, which
after all is the responsibility of both the government and its citizens.
The IRS actively avoids a "subjective determination as to whether the
government benefits" from the activities in question."lt The IRS has
noted that "the attitude of the appropriate governmental unit is the
only reliable indicator as to what the government considers to be its
burden."' 4 "When a particular activity has been engaged in by a
government unit on a regular basis for a significant length of time
before it is taken over by an organization, it may be apparent that the
activity is a burden of government."'15 Other types of objective
manifestations are found "if the budget of the governmental unit made
provision for the activity in question.""1 6 In the Royals case, the IRS
exhaustively listed a long history of government support, including
subsidies, and involvement with the Royals.
17
Another argument against the IRS's approval rests on the
assumption that lessening the burden of governments refers to
"traditional" activities and not support for professional sports teams.
Obviously, any limitation based on "tradition" is immediately suspect
since tradition must start somewhere. Should the doctrine be limited
110. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-30-024 (July 28, 1995).
111. If the city may not take up an activity because it is prevented by law, however, then no
one can "actually" lessen the burden because the government is prohibited from undertaking the
activity itself.
112. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-30-024 (July 28, 1995).
113. Gen. Cons. Mem. 37,401 (Feb. 2, 1978).
114. Gen. Cons. Mem. 39,733 (May 24, 1988)(citing Gen. Cons. Mem. 39,347 (Oct. 20,
1982)). See also Gen. Cons. Mem. 37,401 (Feb. 2, 1978)("the government itself is the proper party
to decide if a particular activity is sufficiently in the public interest to be recognized as a
legitimate function of government").
115. Gen. Cons. Mem. 39,733 (May 24, 1988).
116. Id.
117. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-30-024 (July 28,1995).
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to government functions circa 1601 such as the repair of "bridges,
ports, havens, causeways, churches, sea-banks, highways, etc.?' ' 18 As
the IRS wrote, "[t]he concept of what is a legitimate and appropriate
governmental function certainly has not been static. The real issue for
the IRS is determining whether a specific activity is considered a
burden by the relevant governmental units." 1 9
The critics seem to feel that the IRS should step in and end
professional sports subsidies. The criticism seems fair, insofar as it
addresses the possibility that IRS approval forces the federal
government to subsidize one city's love affair with its team. This is
really the crux of the argument: cities everywhere need bridges built,
economic development programs, and the like, yet the federal
government does not collect taxes for such activities or from
organizations that administer such activities. What truly rankles the
critics is that keeping a professional team local is equated with
virtuous civic activities.' ° How can this issue be resolved? Should the
IRS make subjective determinations of which activities are worthy of
federal subsidy?12' Or should the test somehow factor in "fairness" as
part of its objective structure?
The best way to gauge whether a certain activity deserves federal
subsidy is to add a third prong to the lessening the burden test. This
prong would simply ask whether other similarly situated cities
demonstrate objective manifestations of supporting the questionable
activity. The IRS should ask, in the Royals case, do other large cities
traditionally subsidize efforts to retain or acquire teams? This test
adds a certain fairness by considering the interest of citizens in other
cities insofar as it does not allow a single city to receive a federal
subsidy for expenditures not subsidized in other cities. This third
prong also prevents local government officials and organizations from
118. Wheeler v. Smith, 50 U.S. 59, 77-78 (1850).
119. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-30-024 (July 28,1995).
120. A broader criticism is that the federal government should not subsidize any
local activities. This is not addressed here, but it seems overly idealistic. After all, a local
university or church's exemption is a subsidy for local activities, as are the state tax and state
estate tax deductions. Should these exemptions remain while the "lessening the burden"
exemption is eliminated?
121. Having the IRS make such essentially legislative decisions violates the separation of
powers clause. It should also be noted that the United States Constitution requires that all taxes
"shall be uniform throughout the United States." U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, §8, cl. 1. See also Knowlton
v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900)(holding clause requires geographic uniformity). This would suggest
that the IRS is constitutionally obligated to set forth some objective guidelines for a finding of
lessening the burdens, rather than making ad hoc subjective decisions.
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conspiring to create a paper trail of interest so that the organization
could find itself exempt from income tax.' Thus, the IRS should ask
whether other cities with professional sports teams consider it their
burden to retain the teams.
Even under this proposed test, the Succesion Plan should succeed
because there are ample "objective manifestations" of similarly
situated cities expending considerable resources, human and capital, in
acquiring or retaining teams. The Tampa Bay-St. Petersburg
experience is illustrative. After Major League Baseball expanded in
1977, Tampa Bay and St. Petersburg organized a governmental group,
the Pinellas Sports Authority, to "get a team." m The group tried
seven times to acquire a team124 before Major League Baseball
awarded them an expansion franchise. 125 The pattern was similar each
time: the Tampa Bay-St. Petersburg Group would make an offer
laden with subsidies and a promise to build a stadium (which it
actually built in 1993), and other cities would up the ante to prevail.12
For example, in 1988 the Chicago White Sox listened to offers from
Tampa Bay-St. Petersburg, which included use of the new, taxpayer
financed stadium ($103 million), a low interest loan ($20 million), and
liberal media rights ($10 million).' 2 Chicago and Illinois were forced
to respond; promising to build, at taxpayer cost, a new park (up to
$180 million) and additional concessions ($60 million) for the White
Sox-a cost exceeding the team's retail value!' ' The Oakland
Athletics, Seattle Mariners, and San Francisco Giants also wrung
122. The organizations that receive tax exempt status are not necessarily non-profit. One
organization that lessened the burden of government leased police and fire vehicles to the city
and sold "certificates of participation" to private investors. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-30-024 (July 28,
1995).
123. Marc Topkin, Tampa Bay Ends 18 Year Quest For Team, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Mar.10, 1995,
at BB7.
124. A total of six teams contemplated relocating to Tampa Bay-St. Petersburg: the
Minnesota Twins in 1983, the Oakland Athletics in 1984, the Chicago White Sox in 1986-88, the
Texas Rangers in 1988, the Seattle Mariners in 1991, and the San Francisco Giants in 1991. In
addition, Tampa Bay-St. Petersburg were passed over for expansion franchises in 1990. Id. Legal
battles over the previous aborted acquisitions are still pending. See, e.g., Terry Blount, Suit Could
Keep Astros Here, HOUSTON CHRON., Nov. 2, 1995, at 8.
125. Id.
126. The stadium cost $103 million, and incurs $15 million in losses per year since no team
will occupy it until 1998. John D. Finerty, Jr., Comment, Subverting the Internal Revenue Code in
the "Game" of Sports Stadium Financing, 1 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 301, 315-16 (1991).
127. Id.
128. Id. The ultimate cost of government subsidies could reach $600 million. Neal R. Pierce,
Should Taxpayers Subsidize New Stadiums, NAT'L J., Mar. 10, 1990, at 590.
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concessions from local governments after beginning to negotiate with
Tampa Bay-St. Petersburg.' 9 Since the number of teams seeking
franchises exceeds the number of franchises, local governments can,
and do, wring concessions from local communities.m One author calls
this type of subsidy bidding, "Franchises Playing Shotgun
Economics. '131 Regardless of the name, local governments do
subsidize baseball teams in an effort to retain or acquire them.' 2
129. Michael H. Judrez, Note, Baseball's Antitrust Exception, 17 HASTINGS CoMM/ENT L.J.
737, 742 (1995)(citing Baseball's Antitrust Immunity, 1992: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Antitrust, Monopolies and Business Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d
Sess. 90 (1993)).
130. Stephen R. Ross, Monopoly Sports Leagues, 73 MINN. L. REv. 643,649 (1989):
During congressional hearings, Senator Slade Gorton remarked, "[t]earns threaten to
move not because the present city is not supporting teams in a totally adequate
fashion-very frequently at a profit-but simply because the artificial shortage of
teams creates a great bidding war;" and Senator Charles Mathias acknowledged that
"[o]nly the owners can win these bidding wars;" and Major League Baseball Players
Executive Director Donald Fehr added, "[s]imply put, were there no Denver to
threaten to move to ... , the [baseball] owners could not coerce concessions from
existing franchise cities and/or potential expansion cities."
Id. at 650-51 (quoting Professional Sports Community Protection Act of 1985: Hearings on S. 259
and S. 287 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transp., 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 2
(1985)).
131. See JuArez, supra note 129, at 742.
132. Recent examples include:
(1) Philadelphia Phillies-Philadelphia phased out a ticket tax, provided the Phillies
with $1 million for a new outfield scoreboard, and assumed $745,000 annually in debt
service payments for a Panavision scoreboard the Phillies installed. The city also
allowed the Phillies to construct special baseball suites and to keep 60% of the related
revenue, resulting in a $2.5 million revenue reallocation from the city to the Phillies.
(2) Texas Rangers-To induce the relocation of a professional baseball team, the City
of Arlington purchased local broadcasting rights for 10 years from the team owners for
$3 million more than it could recover. Arlington also publicly funded the renovation of
Texas Stadium and provided a highly advantageous lease. The total price tag was
estimated at $21 million.
(3) San Diego Padres-Faced with the imminent sale of the San Diego Padres to an
owner bent on moving the team to the east coast, the San Diego City Council voted to
advance the team enough cash to cover bonus payments owed to 10 players, while
efforts to find a local owner continued.
Ross, supra note 130, at 761 nn.26, 28 (citing R. Baade, Is There An Economic Rationale For
Subsidizing Sports Stadiums?, 18 HEARTLAND INS. POLICY STUDY No. 13, Feb. 23, 1987 (Phillies));
Professional Sports Antitrust Immunity, Hearings on S. 172, S. 259, and S. 298 Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 260 (1985)(Rangers); L. SOBEL, PROF. SPORTS & THE
LAW 531-32 (1977)(Padres). See also Michael K. Ozanian, Brooke Grabarek, Foul (Pro
Baseball), FIN. WORLD, Sept. 1, 1994, at 18 (local sales tax on beer at one quarter cent to build
baseball-only stadium).
[VOL. 19:483
BALL FOUR: THE IRS WALKS THE KANSAS CITy ROYALS
Why do taxpayers and governments fund these teams? First, a
team brings money into a city or downtown area. In assessing the
Royals' impact on its locale, the IRS noted:
The Club's presence provides economic, entertainment, and
recreational benefits to the greater City area. A 1989 government-
sponsored study described the impact of the City's two professional
sports franchises, the Team and the Football Team, on the State's
economy. The study shows: (1) the presence of the franchises results
in local economic growth from job creation and tourist spending; (2)
local economic impact from the presence of the franchises in the
categories of sales, jobs, and salaries/wages is $111.5 million; (3)
tourism to the games is responsible for the substantial increase in
sales, jobs, and salaries/wages; (4) tourism to the games created
4,418 jobs in the greater City area; and (5) the franchises generate
millions of dollars in State taxes. M
The Milwaukee Brewers are estimated to generate $200 million
annually in economic activity1 34; the San Francisco Giants will "create
6,455 jobs and pump $125 million into the city's economy" if they get
their downtown stadium'5; and the Hoosier Dome/Convention Center
in Indianapolis has been "a major catalyst for development and
redevelopment in the downtown area." 136
Also, "[p]ersonal and civic ego are as much a part of stadium
mania as sheer greed."1" In some local eyes, the Milwaukee Brewers
"stamp Milwaukee as a 'Major League City' affecting not only the way
people around the country view Milwaukee, but also the way
Milwaukeeans view ourselves."' Ewing Kauffman summed up these
twin attributes when he said of the Royals:
The economic value a baseball team brings to a city can't be
overlooked ...we are the smallest market in baseball, yet we
bring in $160 million to Kansas City every year. In addition, for six
133. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-30-024 (July 28, 1995).
134. Finerty, Jr., supra note 126, at 313.
135. Edward Epstein, Ballpark Plan Called Boon to Economy, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 27, 1996, at
A-1.
136. Finerty, Jr., supra note 126, at 317. Critics charge economic benefits of sports franchises
are vastly overstated. See, e.g., Wilstein, supra note 100 (explaining cities justify paying subsidies
by arriving at "spin-off revenue" through "arbitrary, false, and misleading" multipliers and
stadiums are poor substitutes for other investments); Ross, supra note 130, at 649 n.22 (arguing
instead of causing true economic growth, sports franchises merely serve to realign existing jobs
and spending from manufacturing economy to service economy (Baade, Heartland Institute
Policy Study), and 83% of sports facilities run at a loss and benefits probably accrue
disproportionately to upper and middle classes).
137. Wilstein, supra note 100.
138. Finerty, Jr., supra note 126, at 313.
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months of the year your name is in every newspaper and on every
TV station in the country. When you take that into consideration,
it's worth it to build a $100 million stadium.i
9
Whether one agrees with these reasons or not, there is evidence
to demonstrate an objective manifestation that government officials
consider it their burden to travel to distant League headquarters to
campaign and promise enormous subsidies in an effort to retain their
cities' teams. If local governments in Denver, Philadelphia, Tampa
Bay, San Jose, and on and on are warring with one another to take or
retain teams, it seems the time, money, and effort are certainly
burdens of government.
b. Does the Succession Plan Actually Lessen The Burden of Government?
In any case, the IRS found that retaining the Royals in Kansas
City was a burden, and that local government officials considered the
burden theirs. The Kansas City Foundation then needed to show,
through all the "facts and circumstances,"' 10 that the Royals
Succession Plan "actually" lessened the burden of the government. 141
Interestingly enough, no critic focused on this area of the ruling. Yet,
it is technically the weakest and most incomplete part of the Rulings.
The IRS cited three factors in finding that the Succession Plan did
indeed actually lessen the burden on government. By purchasing stock
and funding the Royals operating losses, the Kansas City Foundation
will supplement the local governments subsidies.142 By keeping the
Royals in the Sports Complex, the Kansas City Foundation helps fund
the improvements and maintenance cost of the facility.143 Finally, the
139. Id.
140. Revenue Ruling 85-2 provides additional guidance:
[T]he fact that the government or an official of the government expresses approval of
an organization and its activities is also not sufficient to establish that the organization
is lessening the burdens of government. The interrelationship between the organization
and the government may provide evidence that the government considers the
organization's activities to be its burden . . . .A favorable working relationship
between the government and the organization is strong evidence that the organization
is actually "lessening" the burdens of the government.
Rev. Rul. 85-2, 1985-1 C.B. 178.
141. Rev. Rul. 85-1, 1985-1 C.B. 178.
142. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-30-024 (July 28, 1995).
143. Id.
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Kansas City Foundation will "also play an ownership role [Major
League Baseball] will not permit government to play."1"
Each of these factors comprise one sentence in the Private Letter
Ruling and are not convincing.145 To begin with, there is no guarantee
in the Succession Plan that the Club will cease to need the rent and
other subsidies-only that pre-existing operating losses, generated while
subsidies were in effect, will be covered. No evidence suggests that
having the stadium free of Royals games would produce losses that
exceed the cost of subsidies. Also, the reasoning that government
would run the activity if it could, is explicitly rejected as a factor in
another IRS publication: "[i]f an organization is created to perform
these prohibited [to government] activities, it is not entitled to
exemption on a 'lessening the burdens' basis. After all, if the
government cannot perform an activity, how can that activity be a
burden to government?"'" The issues are debatable and the IRS has
incited the debate by devoting only three sentences to these factors.
The IRS Ruling simply missed the point of what burden was
actually relieved. If a new owner bought the Royals free of any
compulsion to keep them local, the "shotgun economics" would
require local officials to ante up more subsidies and maybe even build
a new stadium. There are more cities vying for franchises as of this
writing than in the 1970's, so the new subsidies would need to be
larger. If the Royals left, then the local officials would be forced to
help bid for new teams by anteing up the same subsidies. It is these
burdens that are at least temporarily avoided. By focusing on a
national scene, as a third prong would require, these facts would be
readily evident. The plan allows local buyers to come forward and
144. Id. See also Gen. Cons. Mem. 38693 (April 15, 1981Xdenying exemption to economic
development corporation that loaned money to new businesses because state constitution
prohibited government from similar lending).
145. Lee A. Sheppard of Tax Analyst argued that the Royals serve no public purpose and
that fans are not benefited. See Sheppard, Curve Ball, supra note 9, at 155-54. That criticism is
misguided; Ms. Sheppard cites a Tax Court case, Columbia Park and Recreation Association v.
Commissioner, 88 TC 1 (1987), as authority that those are requirements for a finding of lessening
governmental burden. However, in that case the defendant organization did not pass either of
the two criteria set forth in Revenue Ruling 85-1. Here, the Kansas City Foundation did make a
showing that the government considers maintaining the Royals a burden and that they actually
lessened the burden. Having done that, there is no reason in either case law, statute, or
regulation why the community foundation would have to go on to prove "public purpose" and
"benefit to the fans."
146. Robert Louthian, Amy Henchey, Lessening The Burdens of Government, ExEMPT ORGS.
CONTINUING PROF'LEDUC. TECHNICAL INSTRUCION PROGRAM, at 17 (IRS Exempt Organizations
Technical Division). See also Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,693 (April 15, 1981).
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gives them preference insofar as they can purchase the team earlier
and for less than outside buyers. 47 During this period the government
can avoid the burden of campaigning for an expansion or another
city's team, a burden that costs other cities millions of dollars and
hundreds of man-hours.
2. "Exclusively"
After establishing that the Royals Succession Plan lessened the
burden of government and thus served a charitable purpose, the
Kansas City Foundation now needed to show the plan "exclusively"
served that purpose. An organization operates exclusively for its
exempt purpose only if it engages primarily in activities which
accomplish such a purpose' and does not allow any part of its
expenditures to inure to an insider.149 The regulations also prohibit an
I.R.C. section 501(c)(3) organization from serving a private interest
other than "incidentally."1" Benefits to private individuals must be
incidental both quantitatively and qualitatively to furthering the
foundation's charitable purpose. 151 "Qualitatively incidental" means
the private benefit is a necessary concomitant of the charitable
activity. "Quantitatively incidental" means the private benefit is
insubstantial in the context of the activities' overall benefit. Thus, any
gain to the Partnership, class A stockholders, or any non-incidental
benefit to private parties, such as club personnel, would mean that the
Fund's ownership of the Royals did not serve a charitable purpose and
no deduction is allowed.152
147. See supra text accompanying note 35.
148. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) (1996). Stated negatively, an organization does not
serve an exclusively exempt purpose if it has a single substantial non-exempt purpose. Better
Business Bureau v. United States, 326 U.S. 279, 283 (1945). As these definitions suggest, the
Code does not attach the common meaning to the term "exclusively."
149. An insider is a person "having a personal interest in the activities of the organization."
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(a)-I (c). "The proscription against inurement generally applies to a distinct
class of private interests-typically persons who, because of their particular relationship with the
organization, have an opportunity to control or influence its activities." Gen. Couns. Mem: 39,862
(Nov. 21,1991).
150. " [T]o be 'incidental', the private benefit must be a necessary concomitant of the activity
which benefits the public at large; in other words, the benefit to the public cannot be achieved
without necessarily benefiting certain private individuals." Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,789 (Dec. 18,
1978).
151. Rev. Rul. 70-186, 1970-1 C.B. 128; Rev. Rul. 68-14, 1968-1 C.B. 244.
152. Improper inurement and private benefit result in loss of 501(c)(3) status; there are no
intermediate penalties. FiSHMAN& SCHWARZ, supra note 49, at 496-98.
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Several safeguards were taken to ensure that no benefits inured to
the Partnership. No dividends were allowed for the class A stock held
by the partners, who contracted to donate to charity any profit on the
sale of such stock. 3 Also, the partners must pay fair market value for
all goods or services from the club, and may not receive compensation
for serving on the Royals' board. 15 Finally, the parties adopted certain
procedures to supplement state corporate law in order to prevent the
partners from benefiting from their positions during negotiations for
purchase of the Royals. 155 The partners effectively removed
themselves from benefiting in the Royals Succession Plan so the
"entire direct benefit of [it] will further charitable purposes." 15
The IRS also concluded that paying million-dollar player salaries
from Kansas City Foundation's funds was "both qualitatively and
quantitatively incidental to the charitable purpose of lessening the
burdens of government." 57 In deciding this issue, the IRS balanced
the private benefit to salaried employees against the public benefit in
keeping the team local. 1  The private benefit was qualitatively
incidental because the Royals' employees' salaries are a "necessary
concomitant of the activity that benefits the public at large." 59 The
benefit was quantitatively incidental because it was "insubstantial
when viewed in relation to the public benefit conferred by the
activity."'" Thus, state fiduciary law and contractual forbearance of
profit ensured that no gain would inure to insiders.
III
The Game plan
This lineup combined to pull off an amazingly complex series of
transactions, which resulted in a perfect balance of the competing
requirements of the Owner, the IRS, and Major League Baseball.
Before discussing the process, it is useful to review the objectives.




157. Id. The conclusion is all the IRS offered; no explanation was provided in the Prvate
Letter Ruling. The following discussion is my estimation of the IRS's rationale, based on rules set
forth in previous publications.
158. The balancing test is set forth in Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,789 (Dec. 18,1978).
159. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 21,1991).
160. Id.
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Kauffman's primary hope was to keep the club local and then
permit local charities to reap the proceeds upon the sale of the team.161
Major League Baseball prohibited a charity from running the Club
and was eager for an auction to settle the ownership issue.'6 The
Community wanted the team and its sale proceeds, but its Counsel, no
doubt, warily eyed the threat to its section 501(c)(3) status and
wondered how ownership could be folded into the community
foundation's charitable purpose while not overly benefiting private
interests.163 How could these three objectives be met?
First, the Club recapitalized into three classes of stock (A, B, and
C). 165 All three have liquidation rights, but only class A stockholders
may vote.165 The Kauffman Trust traded its existing, controlling stock
for all of the authorized class A stock and 75% of the class B stock.
The Royals retained, for the time being, the rest of the class B stock,
and did not issue the class C stock."6
The Kauffman Trust donated all of its class B stock to the
Community Foundation.167 The Partnership purchased the class A
stock from the Trust,168 which pursuant to its governing instrument,
donated the proceeds to the Foundation. The Foundation, in turn,
used the proceeds to buy stock from the Club. 169 The Community
161. See supra Part I.A.
162. Id.
163. See discussion supra Part I.D.2.
164. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-30-024 (July 28, 1995). In the third Private Letter Ruling, 95-30-026,
the IRS found this recapitalization did not cause the club to have more than one class of stock
under I.R.C. section 1361(b)(1)(D) and will not jeopardize its S corporation status. Id. No gain or
loss was recognized on the transfer and the adjusted basis remained the same. Id.
165. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-30-024 (July 28, 1995).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Here, the IRS finally offered some resistance to the Royals' Succession Plan. Counsel
had argued for an estate tax deduction for the Trust's transfer of the class B and C stock to the
Kansas City Foundation under I.R.C. section 2055(a) and of the class A stock to the partnership
under I.R.C. § 2055(a)(3). Priv. Ltr. Rul.95-30-026 (July 28, 1995). The IRS refused to allow any
deduction for the transfer of the class A stock, finding that the Partnership's fiduciary duties to
the commercial enterprise of team and Major League Baseball violated the requirement that the
charitable purpose be served "exclusively." Id.
169. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-30-024 (July 28, 1995). The amount was $37.6 million. Bill Richardson,
Royals' Succession Plan Saluted, Ownership of Club Will Temporarily Go to Community
Foundation, KAN. CITY STAR, July 11, 1995, at C3. The cash donation from the trust to the
advisory fund would be considered a transfer of shares since it is a condition of the donation.
This has a detrimental effect because the shares cannot be deducted at their fair market value but
must be discounted because of their restrictions. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-30-024 (July 28, 1995). See,
e.g., supra notes 152-153 and accompanying text.
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Foundation purchased other stock from the Club with nearly $50
million deposited by the Kauffman's Private Foundation and other
businesses and individuals in an advisory fund which backed .the
"Royals Succession Plan." 170
As a result, the Trust was divested of Club stock, the Partnership
held the voting, class A stock, the Kansas City Foundation held the
majority equity interest in the Club, and the Club had sufficient funds
to cover operating losses for the next six years. Having completed
these transactions, how were the three parties able to meet their
objectives of keeping the team local, keeping the team from a
Charity's control and maintaining its exempt status?
Major League Baseball flatly prohibits a charity from running one
of "its" teams, but approved of the Partnership's control of the class A
stock. The Partnership chose a "Designated Representative" to hold
sole authority in dealings between Major League Baseball and the
Club and to sit on the Board of Directors of the Club. 71 Although he
functions as the controlling shareholder, the Designated
Representative owes a fiduciary duty to the Club and the other
stockholder, the Kansas City Foundation." This de facto private
ownership received Major League Baseball approval before the
rulings came out.
As class B and C stockholder, the Community Foundation has
less glamorous rights. The Community Foundation may appoint two
members to the Club's Board of Directors; these members are privy to
the Clubs operations and finances, but that is the extent of their
administrative rights over the club.'1 This coincides with the IRS's
position that the Kansas City Foundation needs to keep commercial
and charitable purposes separate 74 There are restrictions as well: The
stocks yield no dividends and must be sold when the class A stock is
sold (on the same terms). 75 Additionally, if the Community
170. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-30.024 (July 28, 1995). Some of the donors include Capital Cities ABC
Foundation Inc., H&R Block Foundation, and the Sprint Foundation. Luder, supra note 16, at
C4.
171. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-30-024 (July 28,1995).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
175. This requirement is commonly referred to as "drag along rights." See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-
30-024 (July 28, 1995).
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Foundation wants to sell its stock, the partnership has the right of first
refusal.'76
One may wonder how the plan keeps the Royals in Kansas City.
Though the plan does not guarantee it, the objective was accomplished
via a stockholder agreement. A six-year window for seeking a local
buyer is assured through a shareholder agreement between the
Partnership, Community Foundation, and the Club.l' The Partnership
has agreed not to sell the class A stock except to a "resident
purchaser" (i.e., a resident of the greater Kansas City Area who agrees
to keep the team in that same area) who is approved by Major League
Baseball. 178 Only after six years could the Partnership sell the team to
a non-resident purchaser. However, there is an exception which
permits the team to be sold at any time if the Partnership determines
that the Club's assets are insufficient to cover its losses.
The Kansas City Foundation would receive both the proceeds on
stock donated to it and recoup the money it raised and spent on
acquiring other stock. Class A and C stockholders would receive their
purchase price, but not interest or appreciation. 19 Distribution of any
remaining funds would be handled as follows: (1) Community
Foundation, as class C stockholder, gets five percent; (2) the
Partnership, as class A stockholder, gets the lesser of (a) five percent
of the remainder or (b) fifteen percent, compounded annually, of the
initial purchase price and, most significantly, must contribute that
amount to an eligible charity within thirty days;"8 (3) the remainder to
the Community Foundation as Class B stock holder."t ' Thus, the
Community Foundation will pocket at least 95% of any profits on a
sale.
The deduction, however, was not equivalent to the full value of
the team. In order to retain its subchapter S status and secure a tax
free recapitalization, the Royals had to confer identical liquidation and
distribution rights.182 This means that one-third of the class A stock
was held by the Partnership and was not deductible. Furthermore, the
shares held by the Partnership have a control premium so that the
176. Id.
177. Id.
17& The purchase price need not be the highest price offered. Credit IRS with Royal Save,
BUFFALO NEWS, May 3, 1995, at D5 (paraphrasing Mike Herman, President of the Royals).
179. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-30-024 (July 28, 1995).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-30-026 (July 28, 1995)(citing I.R.C. 1361(b)(1)(D)).
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Fund's shares, and the deduction, are discounted.' 3 Further discounts
to the Fund's shares and the deduction include:
-the geographical restriction to be imposed on a sale of the team;
-the lack of voting rights in the shares;
-the right of first refusal exercisable by the class A shareholder if
the charity decides to sell the shares;
-the lack of dividend rights in the shares;
-the likelihood that the $90 million cash subsidy will be depleted in
whole or in substantial part before the team is sold;
-the lack of participation rights in or control of the operation and
management of the team;
-the fact that the nature of the bequest is such that charity will
receive nothing of economic value until the team is sold and the
proceeds are distributed to charity; in this regard, the charity has no
control over when and to whom the team will be sold and the receipt
of the sales price;
-the subordination of the class B shares to all of the other shares
on a distribution of the team sale proceeds; and
-the lack of marketability of the shares.
184
Thus, for assessing estate taxes, the team's entire value is used,
but the only amount that can be deducted is the discounted value of
the class B and C stock. In other words, the estate paid taxes on the
value of the class A stock and the amount that the other stock was
discounted. If Mr. Kauffman wanted a full deduction, he could have
donated the team without restriction; but, the foundation would then
be required to sell it at auction to the highest bidder because their
fiduciary obligation is to the foundation, not Kansas City. Mr.
Kauffman's decision to pay the tax demonstrates the sincerity of his
desire to keep the team local.
IV
Conclusion
Time will tell if the Royals Succession Plan actually keeps the
Royals in the Kansas City area. Will a local buyer step up to buy the
183. Id.
184. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-30-026 (July 28, 1995). Another possible discount may arise from the
purchase of shares by the Fund with donated cash. The IRS found that the requirement that the
cash be used to purchase the shares made the gift a gift of stock. That stock is discounted in
valuing the deduction. If it is not discounted in a sale by the club, no one will receive the full
dollar deduction.
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smallest market team in baseball' 85 given baseball's current instability?
Will baseball find a commissioner? How much less will the Kansas
City Community Foundation and the Partnership accept from a local
buyer than from an outside buyer? After all, the Kansas City
Foundation still receives the proceeds and would probably like to
avoid too large of a mark down.
The impact of these Private Letter Rulings is also subject to
future evaluation. Did they "stretch the definition of lessening
government burden" to the point where all teams and industries will
be headed for non-profit ownership?" I have argued that the
acquisition and retention of professional sports teams is a traditional,
albeit young, government burden and represents a limited extension of
the general rule. Ultimately, it is the details of the plan, the confluence
of Mr. Kauffman's magnanimity, the Kansas City area's largesse in
donating funds to purchase stock and cover the Royals' operating
losses, and the Partnership's willingness to donate money and time
that made this plan work. These factors are unlikely to be replicated.
The IRS may have stretched the doctrine of lessening the burden, but
in the face of all the evidence of government involvement and in the
face of all this charitable activity, how could the IRS refuse to
recognize such an exceedingly large charitable act? The future will
decide whether there was an extension (when similar deals are made
trying to extend these rulings to less "unique" government pursuits).
But until another Mr. Kauffman comes along, there will be few
successes. As the Kansas City Royals president said:
If there's any other owner in the United States who's willing not to
make a penny off this, to give it all to charity, let him come forward.
We haven't seen any in the history of baseball besides Ewing
Kauffman. We haven't seen any other who are willing to have their
estate go to nothing, have all proceeds go for charity. People aren't
generous like Mr. and Mrs. K were.
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